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ABSTRACT
Noting the apparent inconsistency in attitudes towards free speech
with respect to anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in western liberal
democracies, this article works through the problem of inconsistency
within liberal free speech theory, arguing that this symptomatically
reveals an aporia that exposes the inability of liberal free speech
theory to account for the ways in which free speech actually operates
in liberal social orders. Liberal free speech theory conceptualizes
liberty as smooth, continuous, homogeneous, indivisible and extend-
able without interruption until it reaches the outer limits. This makes
it diﬃcult for liberal free speech theory to account for restrictions that
lie within those outer limits, and therefore for the ways in which
restraints, restrictions and closures are always already at work within
the lived experience of liberty, for it is these – and the inconsistencies
they give rise to – that give freedom its particular texture and timbre
in any given social and cultural context. The article concludes with an
alternative ‘liquid’ theory of free speech, which accounts for the
‘shaping’ of liberty by social forces, culture and institutional practices.
Abbreviations: UK: United Kingdom; MP: Member of Parliament.
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In the spring and summer of 2016, the UK Labour Party was engulfed in controversy
surrounding the tolerance or otherwise of anti-Semitism within its membership. The suspen-
sion of Naz Shah MP, then a parliamentary aide to the Shadow Chancellor, for anti-semitic
postings on her Facebook page during the height of the Gaza crisis in 2014 – prior to her
election as an MP – precipitated ongoing media coverage, and the ensuing furore led the
leader of the party, Jeremy Corbyn – someone well known for his pro-Palestinian politics
and long-standing criticisms of Israel’s policies towards its Occupied Territories – to establish
an independent enquiry and commission; in turn, the UK Parliament Home Aﬀairs Select
Committee also established a separate enquiry into the scope and extent of anti-Semitism
within British political parties (Stewart 2016; Home Aﬀairs Committee 2016). Both the extent
of the controversy and the subsequent commissions of enquiry were a signal of the
intolerability of anti-Semitism within British political and public discourse. This can be
contrasted with the ways in which Islamophobia merits no such urgent attention; indeed,
the former Conservative cabinet minister and now incisive and trenchant critic of govern-
ment policy towards the UK’s Muslim communities, Baronness Sayeeda Warsi, has gone so
far as to suggest that Islamophobia is not only tolerable within British public and political
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life, it has become so normalized within both political and civil society that it has ‘passed the
dinner party test’ (Batty 2011).
The question posed by this contrast between the intolerability of anti-Semitism and
the tolerance, even normalization, of Islamophobia is why the former falls under the
rubric of ‘hate speech’ and the latter does not, or, to put it another way, why the former
is not protected by the rubric of freedom of expression, whilst the other does indeed
appear to be. Indeed, the intolerability of expressions of anti-semitic sentiment has been
intensiﬁed by the UK government’s recent adoption of the International Holocaust
Remembrance Alliance’s deﬁnition of anti-Semitism, which suggests that ‘over-
sweeping condemnation’ of Israel would be a form of anti-Semitism, as would any
criticisms of its policies as a state if those were conceived in relation to Israel as ‘a
Jewish collectivity’ (Walker 2016). This potentially expands the legal proscriptions against
expressions of anti-semitic sentiment from ‘hate speech’ to certain forms of political
criticism, not just of the state of Israel but Zionism as a political movement and ideology
more generally, on the grounds that ‘Zionism, at its core, is the belief based on the state
of Israel to exist [. . .] connection to Israel is a key part of Jewish identity’ (Weisfeld 2016).
It is this connection between Jewish identity and the state of Israel that potentially
makes criticisms of Israel and Zionism anti-semitic and therefore a form of hate speech
that warrants no protection on the grounds of freedom of expression. On the other
hand, Muslim protests against the ways in which the Prophet has been portrayed have
consistently failed to muster any support on the grounds that restrictions on such
portrayals would constitute an intolerable infringement of the right to free speech
even though there is arguably a deeper connection between the Prophet and Muslim
identity than that between Israel/Zionism and Jewish identity since the latter predated
both the state of Israel and political Zionism, whereas the Prophet is the foundational
ﬁgure of the Muslim faith: without him, there is no Muslim identity as such.
Whilst it is notable that many of the public ﬁgures, politicians and intellectual ﬁgures
who vociferously supported the exposure of and clampdown on contemporary expres-
sions of anti-Semitism also vociferously opposed Muslim arguments for protection from
freedom of speech, my purpose in this article will not be to explore any arguments
concerning hypocrisy, cognitive dissonance, double standards and so on, but rather to
take this discrepancy as a point of departure for examining the question of inconsistency
and discrepancy within contemporary and historical liberal theorizations of freedom of
expression, insofar as these theorizations are the most dominant frames through which
issues and controversies concerning freedom of expression are approached. This ques-
tion is particularly pertinent because it compels us to critique liberal free speech theory,
which, since its modern formulation by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty ([1859] 2011), has
been structured around a binary opposition between free expression and censorship
that is precisely the reason why any inconsistency in the manifestation of liberty in
actually existing liberal social orders is itself such a symptomatic aporia that generates
confusion and anxiety among liberal free speech advocates and, most of all, stimulates
an urgent compulsion on their part to straighten the crooked timber of liberty as and
when they can. Through a symptomatic reading of this attitude towards inconsistency, I
will argue that such an aporia in fact exposes the inability of liberal free speech theory to
theorize adequately the ways in which free speech actually operates in liberal social
orders. In turn, this illuminates the inadequacies of liberalism’s theorization of freedom
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more generally, precisely because liberal thought is constituted by an opposition
between freedom and power (which gathers under its rubric all the other antitheses
to liberty such as tyranny, oppression, censorship and so on) that does not, in fact, hold
and which leads, therefore, to an under-theorization of the ways in which power itself
structures and shapes what is experienced as ‘freedom’.
The antipathy towards inconsistency in liberal thought is registered in various tropes
and styles of argument within liberal free speech discourse. ‘[O]ne of the weaknesses of
free speech rhetoric’, writes Lee (1990, 34), ‘has been the tendency to stretch support all
the way from political speech to pornographic expression, under the mistaken belief
that arguments for one must apply to the other’. As I have noted elsewhere, this involves
a logic of substitutability that renders context meaningless and superﬂuous, a logic that
can trace its pedigree all the way back to Mill (Mondal 2014, 36). As Haworth (1998, 27)
has noted, Mill rests his general arguments for freedom of expression on what Mill
himself calls his ‘prioritisation of thought and discussion’, which means that he (Mill)
assumes that the case for ‘that way of collectively striving for the truth and the case for
other freedoms such as the “absolute liberty of expressing and publishing opinions” are
equivalent’ (emphasis in original). In other words, the freedom appropriate to what
Haworth calls ‘the seminar room’ is, by extension, applicable to all other contexts until
it reaches the point where liberty may legitimately be curtailed; conversely, any dis-
turbance or discontinuity of this smooth extensibility is deemed an inappropriate
infringement of liberty. In order to extend the continuity of liberty on which his
argument rests to the greatest possible extent, Mill is compelled to extend it as far as
possible, to the outer limits where the law may legitimately intervene (in his case, the
famous example of direct incitement of a mob standing outside a corn dealer’s house).
Mill thus introduces into modern liberal free speech theory a notion of liberty that
exists as if on a single plane: smooth, continuous, homogeneous, indivisible and extend-
able without interruption until it reaches the outer limits. The dominant governing
metaphor here is that of the horizon, the point beyond which freedom no longer
obtains – hence the binary opposition between freedom of expression and censorship.
The nature of freedom is unidimensional, reducible to the single aspect of its reach, its
extension. From this perspective, only the outer limits signify as legitimate restraints
upon liberty; every restriction or regulation within these limits are aberrations because
there can and should not be any irregularity, distortion, heterogeneity, discontinuity or
inconsistency. This is why the ‘slippery slope’ argument plays such an important role in
liberal free speech advocacy, for its rhetorical function is to keep the horizon at bay, to
raise the spectre that its encroachment signals a dimunition of liberty across the board
precisely because the logic of smooth, planar continuity necessitates that any encroach-
ment at one point signals an encroachment at all points – visually speaking, one might
see it as the conjuring of a circle being narrowed. It is telling, moreover, that the trope
works by introducing an element of verticality (the slope) that upsets what should
otherwise be a smooth, horizontal plane.
In liberal free speech theory – and indeed, in liberal theory generally – freedom is
deﬁned by the outer limits in quantitative terms as ‘scope’ and ‘extent’, which are terms
that feature regularly in liberal discourses on freedom of expression. Qualitative discus-
sions of liberty, including ethical questions about the moral rights and wrongs of
exercising one’s freedom of expression, insofar as they feature at all, appear in liberal
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arguments only as an adjunct or corollary to the quantitative need to expand the reach
of freedom as far as possible. Thus, for example, whilst Mill does indeed talk about
positive liberty, by far the greater emphasis in On Liberty is on negative liberty. Indeed,
his ‘very simple principle’ that is the foundation of his entire argument is a conception of
liberty that is negative:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle [. . .] that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm. (Mill [1859] 2011, 14)
Tellingly, when Mill does discuss positive liberty, he calls it ‘development’ rather than
liberty, and he tends to position it as exterior to liberty itself,
[t]hese are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of
liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals but helping them [. . .]
These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote
tendencies; but they are questions of development. (Mill [1859] 2011, 122–23)
For Mill, liberty involves establishing the conditions in which it is possible for individuals
to pursue as many ‘experiments in living’ as possible so as to contribute to the
progressive development of humankind; each individual’s capacity for development
can and should be nurtured, but this principally involves leaving them alone as far as
possible to get on with it. The positive liberty to which Mill turns as the justiﬁcation of
his argument for liberty thereby rests on a predicate, the negative liberty that enables
the conditions in which it can develop and ﬂourish. More recently, Mill’s typically nine-
teenth-century moral register has been eschewed by liberal discourse on free expres-
sion, which has adopted a strictly legalistic approach that concerns itself with where the
horizon line curtailing the right to freedom of expression should be drawn, leaving aside
all the ethical questions germane to the exercise of one’s freedom as what might be
termed a ‘moral remainder’ (Mondal 2014, 3). Such an approach, by deﬁnition, empha-
sizes negative liberty and is grounded more in the anti-consequentialist liberal tradition
that emerged precisely in order to address some of the weaknesses of Mill’s consequen-
tialist, utilitarian approach (Rawls 2005). However, in grounding free speech in the
discourse of ‘natural’ rights so as to avoid Mill’s consequentialism, this tradition of liberal
thought in fact accentuates and intensiﬁes Mill’s ‘planar’ model because it is even more
rigidly binary in terms of the constitutive distinction between freedom and its other and
therefore stronger in its emphasis on negative liberty: as a natural right, freedom of
expression can only be limited by other rights. Without the backup, as it were, of
consequentialism’s ‘goal’ or ‘purpose’, which might justify limits on free expression
within the horizon of liberty, any restrictions that do appear within that horizon as
part of everyday lived experience become all the more magniﬁed as an intolerable
incursion into the empire of liberty. This may be why contemporary free speech
advocates, especially the more absolutist of them, draw so heavily on anti-
consequentialist arguments in their rhetoric even as they simultaneously (and contra-
dictorily) deploy Millian arguments as well (Mondal 2014).1
This emphasis on negative liberty, then, both generates and is of a piece with the
binarism that is so typical of liberal thought. Liberal conceptions of freedom work in
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terms of a binary between freedom and its other, be it oppression, suppression, censor-
ship, regulation and so on, these antithetical terms being generally substitutable. Again,
one can turn to Mill as the exemplar if not the source of this structure of thinking within
modern liberalism. On Liberty draws a series of sharp distinctions in order to scaﬀold its
argument, the principal one being that between an autonomous and sovereign indivi-
dual, on the one hand, and society (often ﬁgured pejoratively as a ‘mass’), on the other.
As Alan Ryan notes, even other liberals have found Mill’s arguments in On Liberty to be
‘excessively individualistic’, but although many of them may have softened the edges of
the opposition, they have always upheld it since the sovereign individual is at the core
of liberalism: it makes it what it is (Ryan, ‘Introduction’ in Mill [1859] 2011, xxii). Much
depends on the diﬀerence between what Mill calls ‘the external relations of the indivi-
dual’ and ‘all that portion of a person’s life which aﬀects only himself’ (18). From this
opposition, Mill proposes that the latter is
[. . .] the appropriate region of human liberty [which] comprises, ﬁrst, the inward domain of
consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or
speculative, scientiﬁc, moral, or theological. (Mill [1859] 2011, my emphasis)
He then goes on to suggest that
[t]he liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a diﬀerent
principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns
other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and
resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
It is worth dwelling at some length on this because, having established an opposition
between ‘that portion of a person’s life which aﬀects only himself’ and ‘the external
relations of the individual’, he then goes on to suggest that with regard to liberty of
conscience and the liberty to express and publish opinions, this distinction does not in
fact hold, that the latter is in fact ‘practically inseparable’ from the former even though it
‘may seem to fall under a diﬀerent principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct
of an individual which concerns other people’. This auto-deconstruction of the funda-
mental premises of his argument is highly signiﬁcant and has profound implications on
how we might conceptualize not just freedom of expression but also freedom more
generally and the question of the individual/subject in relation to them, which I will
discuss in due course. But for now it suﬃces that we should note that with respect to
freedom of expression, Mill’s sleight of hand enables him to transfer that which is
properly internal to the individual to the world of external relations and thereby
endow upon that latter world – of expressing and publishing opinions – all the proper-
ties of the former. That is, it enables Mill to extend the ‘absolute’ freedom of opinion,
which is proper to the interiority of individual conscience, to the external world of
publishing and expression, and thereby continue that extension along the singular plane
of liberty so conceived right out to the outer limits.
It is precisely because the external world of publishing and expression should mirror,
by extension, the internal world of the conscience – the autonomous mind which should
be allowed to entertain ‘all subjects’ – that Mill’s arguments for ‘liberty of thought and
discussion’ in the second chapter of On Liberty turn on the opposition between
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openness and closure. Since the absolute sovereignty of the conscience is carried over
into the external world of expressing and publishing opinions, Mill argues that the ‘lists’
should be kept perpetually ‘open’ (28) so that any individual can access any and all
possible ideas even though this does, in fact, stand in tension with his other argument
that freedom of expression is necessary in order to enable the ‘truth’ to be ascertained
(comprising his famous ‘infallibility’, ‘testing’ and ‘partiality’ arguments). His martial
metaphors – e.g. ‘both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as
there is no enemy in the ﬁeld’ (50) – when used as a vehicle for this epistemological
argument, would suggest that the truth vanquishes falsehood. But if this is the case,
then the trope of inﬁnite and perpetual openness to all possible ideas must, by the very
process of arriving at the truth, involve a form of closure that Mill would otherwise
suggest is an intolerable infringement of liberty. He thus admits that ‘[w]rong opinions
and practices gradually yield to fact and argument’ and that
As mankind improve [sic], the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or
doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost
be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of
being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is
one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in
the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous.
Perhaps realizing, however, what the implications are for his insistence on inﬁnite and
perpetual openness, he then goes on to suggest that
though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both
senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged
to conclude that all its consequences must be beneﬁcial. The loss of so important an aid to
the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is aﬀorded by the necessity of
explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not suﬃcient to outweigh, is
no triﬂing drawback from, the beneﬁt of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can
no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to
provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the diﬃculties of the question as
present to the learner’s consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient
champion, eager for his conversion. (51)
Having so vigorously argued that the reason freedom of expression is necessary is to
enable the truth to emerge, Mill is here confronted with the implacable implications of
that logic in the form of an admission that if freedom of expression is a means to an end
(truth), that end will itself restrict the very freedom he argues is required to get there. He
is forced, then, to invent a rather lame artiﬁcial simulacrum of freedom (‘some con-
trivance’) concocted by the ‘teachers of mankind’ in order to sustain that which is, on
the one hand, absolutely necessary to human ‘development’ but is, on the other,
oriented eventually towards the cessation of both ‘development’ and the need for
freedom. Against this, Mill is forced to assert that the lists should somehow be kept
open even though it is at odds with his argument about truth in order to keep at bay
the auto-deconstructive implications, namely, that the logic of closure secretly inhabits the
fabric of freedom because it is not its antithesis or its ‘other’ but its necessary supplement,
on which the concept of freedom depends.
In the next section of this article, I will attempt to show how this supplementarity is at
work in ‘free’ societies, but for now, it is worth re-stating that if, in the course of both his
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argument that establishes the premises of liberty and the subsequent discussion of
applications and practical consequences, Mill is compelled to blur the lines of the sharp
distinctions he draws in order to establish his ‘very simple principle’, those distinctions
are nevertheless the structural foundations of his view of liberty and this bequeaths to
subsequent liberal thought a note of regret concerning any exceptions that might
necessarily arise in the translation of liberal theory into lived experience. Even the
most pragmatic of liberals see restraints on freedom as a regrettable but unavoidable
necessity, thus suggesting that restraint (or closure) is inimical to freedom and antitheti-
cal to it. While many contemporary thinkers writing within the broad liberal tradition
have addressed liberal free speech theory’s limitations with respect to hate speech with
some, like Jeremy Waldron and the critical race theorists, demonstrating that Mill’s ‘harm
principle’ extends to forms of speech beyond direct incitement (Waldron 2012; Matsuda
et al. 1993), and others addressing the tension that consequently arises between liberty
and equality (Levin 2010; Saunders 2011), I would suggest that we should go further and
deconstruct the constitutive oppositions of liberalism in order to attend to the restraints,
restrictions and closures that are always already at work within the lived experience of
liberty, for it is these – and the inconsistencies they give rise to – that give freedom its
particular texture and timbre in any given social and cultural context.
Discursive liquidity: shaping freedom of speech
In contrast to the liberal conception of freedom as ‘planar’ and unidimensional, I would
like to amplify and substantiate Talal Asad’s (2011, 6763 [Kindle]) intuition that social
forces, culture and institutional practices ‘shape’ freedom, especially freedom of expres-
sion, in particular, context-speciﬁc and historically determined ways. Rather than visua-
lizing freedom in terms of its scope and extent, across a ﬂat and uniform social space
that is emptied of context, I suggest we conceptualize liberty in terms of forces and
ﬂows channelled by and through an irregular and uneven terrain. From this perspective,
as regards freedom of expression in particular, discourse can be conceptualized as
elemental, as ‘liquid’; it will follow whatever channels it can and ﬁll the available
space.2 The freedom of discourse, then, is not one of being or not being free, of having
or not having free speech. In so far as discourse is plastic, malleable, freedom of
discourse is channelled, shaped, sculpted, and, like ﬂows of liquid, may in turn channel
and sculpt. Some of the forces that shape free speech are dense, have great mass and,
like the earth itself, are only slowly and incrementally modiﬁed: these are the great
institutional bulwarks, law, the state, the bureaucratic machinery; others are like shoals
of sand, as much shaped by as shaping the currents: civil society, culture, ideology,
moral norms and values. The social terrain within which liberty is lived is, then, some-
thing like that represented by an ordnance survey map marked by contours indicating
gradients and degrees of resistance and obstruction.
If we were to illustrate the ways in which this conception of free expression is at work
in actually existing free societies, we might ﬁrst point to the institutional landmarks that
mark the terrain through which it ﬂows, in particular, the legal statutes and provisions
through which the power of the state to shape freedom is enforced. In relation to the
discrepancy with which I began this article, one might point to the ways in which the
ﬂow of anti-semitic expression is intensely obstructed by the incitement to racial hatred
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provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 which encompasses ‘racialised’ religious groups
such as Sikhs and Jews but does not cover other religious groups such as Muslims,
Hindus and Christians, although the UK’s blasphemy laws would have performed an
adjacent function with respect to Christians until their abolition in 2008. In contrast,
although the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (RRHA) was framed as an extension
of the protection against incitement to hatred enjoyed by Jews and Sikhs to other
religious groups, its passage into law was itself shaped by cultural and ideological
forces that took great pains to ensure that the extensive protections aﬀorded racialized
groups against hate speech in the 1986 Public Order Act were not carried over into the
new Act (Mondal 2014, 185–192).
These attenuating forces accepted the existing bulwarks on free expression – by, for
example, accepting the need for limitations on freedom of expression with regard to
certain classes of hate speech – but mobilized on behalf of particular conceptions of
‘free speech’ in order to ensure that the terrain of free expression was not altered so as
to materially obstruct free expression with respect to other, non-racialized religious
identities. Consequently, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was eﬀectively
rendered a ‘dead letter’. This partially explains, then, the inconsistency in the UK with
regard to anti-semitic and Islamophobic expression, but it must be borne in mind that
this is itself part of a wider terrain shaping free expression in the UK, which includes
legal statutes that restrict expression with regard to the right to protest; copyright; the
restriction of access to forms of expression based on age; the prohibition of certain
forms of expression because of their exploitation and abuse of other persons; laws on
libel, slander, privacy and so on. All these legal provisions constitute a jagged patchwork
of restrictions and restraints that channel speech and expression, with varying degrees
of intensity and force.
However, such legal landmarks are but one dimension of the ways in which expres-
sion is shaped. As the above example of the RRHA demonstrates, if the terrain through
which expression ﬂows is sculpted and shaped by ideological and cultural forces that are
themselves articulated by forms of expression that are channelled by and through it,
then the lie of the land, so to speak, is itself complexly determined by the dialectic
between what is expressed and the limits to expression. If the Public Order and Racial
and Religious Hatred Acts constitute two particular legal landmarks which channel
understandings of permissible and impermissible speech with respect to religious
identity, then these are themselves shaped by cultural and ideological framings of
‘religion’ ‘race’ and identity. As Meer (2008) has noted, wider understandings about
religion and race as ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ identities, respectively, are at work
within contemporary British society, and I have argued at length elsewhere how these
wider understandings fed into the speciﬁc debates that surrounded the introduction of
the RRHA in ways that decisively shaped and attenuated the form in which it eventually
arrived onto the statute books (Mondal 2014, 186–188). Beyond these are more general
ideological conﬁgurations impalpably and imperceptibly shaping, for example, percep-
tions and prejudices pertaining to particular religious identities such as Muslims and
Jews.
Liberal free speech theory ﬁnds it acutely diﬃcult to account for the ways in which
culture and ideology predetermine the shape and ﬂow of free expression principally
because, following Mill, there is an aversion to closure. Moreover, there is little
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recognition of the ways in which closure – that is, the ways in which all possible ideas
are not always and perpetually available to any given individual – relates to foreclosure,
those predetermined and pre-inscribed limits not just to expression but also thought.
This is principally because, on the one hand, liberal theory’s reliance on the sovereign
individual relies on an abjuring of any substantive theory of subjectivity as, for example,
has developed in various non-liberal accounts such as Marxism, psychoanalysis, struc-
turalism and post-structuralism and, on the other, because the individual’s sovereignty
would be inevitably and always already compromised by any theory that presupposes
not only that this individual’s autonomy is not a pre-given axiom but, in fact, is
impossible.
Mill does, in fact, come close to acknowledging something akin to a theory of
hegemony; indeed, it is paradoxically central to the argument of On Liberty, as is evident
in the above quotation about ‘the truths which have reached the point of being
uncontested’ being the consequence of an ‘inevitable and indispensable’ process. His
principal concern is not with political tyranny, as such, although, like every liberal he is of
course opposed to it; rather, in On Liberty, he is more concerned with the ‘moral
coercion’ exerted by society on individuals to conform to certain expected norms of
thought and behaviour. It is on the grounds of resisting this social pressure that he
makes his case for liberty of conscience, of thought and expression and of pursuing
one’s own course in life as long as one does not harm or interfere with the life and
liberty of others. At times, he explicitly suggests that the eﬀect of this is to foreclose
what might be thought or even perceived by any given individual: ‘In our times’, he
writes,
from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a
hostile and dreaded censorship . . .. I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in
preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any
inclination, except for what is customary. (Mill [1859] 2011, 70, my emphasis)
This seems to be very closely aligned to a Gramscian theory of hegemony, but if this is
the eﬀect of social coercion, such that an individual appears to consent to their own
oppression, then this not only undermines the individual’s autonomy of thought, but
also forecloses any possibility of thinking otherwise: ‘[a]nd thus is kept up a state of
things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of
ﬁning or imprisoning anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undis-
turbed’ (39). Again Mill here threatens to undermine his own argument, so he is
compelled to state that ‘[o]ur merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no
opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active eﬀort for
their diﬀusion’ (ibid.). If social coercion ‘roots out no opinions’, then this suggests that in
the minds of men all possibilities are always inﬁnitely open, but the eﬀect of the
coercion is simply to keep a lid on the expression of them. This notion of closure is
more congenial to Mill than the implied foreclosure he admits elsewhere because, as we
have seen, one of the structuring oppositions upholding his argument is the one
between openness and closure; foreclosure, on the other hand, undercuts this opposi-
tion and compromises the autonomy of the individual. If the individual is not autono-
mous, if what s/he thinks is not a matter of rational choice, but an eﬀect of power, of
structural relations in society, of unconscious and irrational motivations, then s/he is not
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and cannot possibly be the ‘sole author’ (Smith 2012) of themselves and of what they
say: they are, instead, subject to pressures external to themselves – thereby under-
cutting the basis of Mill’s ‘very simple principle’.
It is, for this reason, that Mill turns Marxian conceptions of power and ideology on
their head: Mill is concerned with the social ‘tyranny’ of the majority over an embattled
minority, whereas the Marxian tradition is concerned with the ways in which ideology
enables and sustains the hegemony of a minority over a majority. This minoritarian
emphasis in Mill is a strand of liberal thought that resonates particularly strongly in
contemporary free speech advocates who portray themselves as an embattled minority
defending enlightenment rationalism (and, sotto voce, male white privilege) from the
tyranny of ‘political correctness’. And just as Mill’s pressing need to quarantine the
rationally autonomous and sovereign individual from social tyranny blinded him to
the pressure of structural forces he is elsewhere forced to admit but nonetheless keep
at bay, so too does contemporary liberal thought continue to ﬁnd diﬃculty in account-
ing for the eﬀect of power relations and structural forces, nowhere more so than in the
circulation and ﬂow of ideas, opinions, and forms of discourse. ‘All the political changes
of the age promote [social conformism and mass mediocrity]’, writes Mill in chapter two
of On Liberty:
since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education
promotes it, because education brings people under common inﬂuences, and gives them
access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of com-
munication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact,
and keeping up a rapid ﬂow of changes of residence between one place and another. The
increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diﬀusing more widely the advan-
tages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to
general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a
particular class, but of all classes. A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing
about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other
free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State [. . .] [which ensures] there
ceases to be any social support for nonconformity – any … protection [of] opinions and
tendencies at variance with those of the public. (83)
It is diﬃcult to see how under conditions of such extensive material pressure it could
ever be possible for the ‘diversity of opinion’ that gives rise to individuality to remain
perpetually and inﬁnitely open, especially given that he concludes here by saying that
the greatest eﬀect of such material pressure is on the conformism of ‘public opinion’ and
its eﬀect on government. What Mill is doing here is what he does elsewhere too:
gesturing beyond closure towards an understanding of foreclosure not merely as an
eﬀect of political suppression or even psychological coercion but as something that
materially structures ‘free’ societies.
Politics and the shaping of free speech
There is also another way in which freedom of expression is channelled and shaped by
social forces, and this is by what I have elsewhere termed the ‘politics of free speech’
(Mondal 2014). This politics is, of course, most visible during public controversies over
free speech itself, but by far the most signiﬁcant way in which the politics of free speech
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shapes and channels the ﬂow of social discourse and circulation of ideas is through what
might be termed a vernacular politics of free speech, which encompasses the everyday
regulation and negotiation, on the one hand, of speech codes in the workplace and
other public spaces, all of which intersect with legal, institutional, cultural and ideolo-
gical frameworks and, on the other hand, the more informal testing and contesting of
the limits of speech proprieties in various other social spaces. Moreover, the modalities
of such politics can encompass both the singular and discrete acts of particular indivi-
duals and the public mobilization of groups and organizations within civil society – and
any position in between.
Take, for example, the circulation of knowledge in institutions of learning such as
schools and universities. Debates and disputes about curriculum and canon selection
(the two are, of course, intimately related) are not often framed in terms of freedom of
expression; on the other hand, it has long been acknowledged that there are deeply
political concerns at work in the selection of a curriculum and the formation of a
pedagogic or cultural canon, including questions about power, authority and exclusion.
These inevitably intersect with and impinge upon the ﬂow of discourse, but perhaps one
reason concerns about freedom of expression are seldom raised is because most people
accept that there needs to be some kind of closure in any curriculum, that not everything
can be taught within it, and therefore a process of selection and exclusion must inevitably
take place. As a result, in most discussions and debates about curricula, the politics of
knowledge rarely intersects with the politics of free speech because these debates are
rarely – if ever – framed in terms of censorship, and they are rarely framed in terms of
censorship because the censorship remains largely invisible – although, as I shall argue,
whether to even call it censorship is problematic. When the politics of free speech
involved in the practice, policy and policing of education does become visible, such
questions are raised, but they are broached in such ways as to invite further examination
of the inadequacy of prevailing conceptions of free speech in accounting for them.
In the United States, the adoption of public (that is, state) school textbooks, and
therefore the content and structure of the curriculum, has long been the arena for
political contestation between liberals and conservatives (Taylor 2017). Christian pres-
sure concerning the content of school textbooks in the United States can be traced back
to the mid-nineteenth century, but it is only since the advent of the Civil Rights and
Women’s Movements from the 1960s – and the subsequent ‘New Right’ reaction on
behalf of Christian fundamentalist groups – that the politics of education has become a
prominent and highly visible frontline in the ‘culture wars’ (13–16). The existing research
literature on these eﬀorts to shape the textbooks being procured on behalf of schools in
the United States, which is largely conducted from within a liberal paradigm, does frame
them in terms of ‘censorship’ but it does so either solely in relation to conservative
eﬀorts – thereby assuming that ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ eﬀorts to shape the curriculum
do not warrant consideration under the censorship rubric – or they dismiss both liberal
and conservative eﬀorts from the Olympian height of an idealist commitment to inﬁnite
and perpetual openness, ‘treating both as irksome distractions from the true purpose of
education’ (26). Either way, an opposition is set up between openness and closure and
this in turn enables the construction of a subsequent opposition between liberal shap-
ing as ‘inclusive’ and conservative eﬀorts as ‘exclusionary’. While the latter is aligned
with ‘censorship’, the former is identiﬁed as ‘selection’:
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While censorship involves approaching literature with the intent of weeding out what is
objectionable, selection involves approaching literature with the intent of ﬁnding that
which is most excellent. Censorship seeks to exclude where selection seeks to include;
selection prioritizes the right of the reader to read, while censorship prioritizes the protec-
tion of the reader from the presumed eﬀects of reading. (7)
Taylor (2017) notes, however, that ‘humanist’ pressure on publishers and school boards
in the wake of the Civil Rights and Women’s movements initially proceeded with regard
to ‘the eradication of racist and sexist language’ as well as the ‘inclusion of material by
and about racial minorities and women in the curriculum’ (28). This being the case, it is
clear that the opposition set up by liberal observers of this particular form of politics
between conservative ‘censorship’ and liberal ‘selection/inclusion’ (with its connotations
of openness) does not entirely hold. This is evident in the terminology employed to
characterize the process, which ranges from ‘pre-publication censorship’ to ‘proactive
censorship’ to ‘silent editing’ (6). The last term in particular illuminates the extent to
which any sharp distinctions cannot be sustained for the adjective is clearly redundant –
all editing is silent and invisible unless speciﬁcally ﬂagged up in order to draw attention
to itself (as in scholarly editions) – and the term’s emergence as a ‘by-product’ of James
J. Lynch and Bertrand Evans’ 1963 survey of literature anthologies, grammar and
composition books, during which they discovered that ‘pages were removed and
works were cut to ﬁt the available space’ (24) merely underscores the point: all editors
wrestle with these considerations on a daily basis; this does not make them censors
because censorship is not the appropriate term to be applied here.
Taylor is right to suggest that ‘content analysis’ of textbooks that have been subject
to ‘expurgation’ may reveal the ‘internal logic of the censoring bodies more clearly than
does an examination of straightforward banning. While the removal of an entire book
from the curriculum [. . .] sends a clear message as to the intolerability of the views it
expresses[...]it is not clear what aspects of the book are most intolerable; however, a
'line-by-line comparison of an expurgated text with its source text illuminates exactly
which words in which contexts and combinations are found objectionable’ (21). She
pursues this analysis to great eﬀect, but the point I am making is that this is only the
visible tip of a very large iceberg which, in these instances, can with some justiﬁcation
and rigorous analysis be aligned with ‘censorship’ but which, in most cases, cannot
because the line between editing and expurgation is not as clear as liberal theories of
free speech and censorship would have us believe. Indeed, the same lack of distinction is
also operative with respect to ‘selection’. The ‘removal’ of a work may be due to
censorship but there are other reasons why works might be removed from the curricu-
lum, reasons which undercut the alignment of ‘removal’ with ‘censorship’ and, conver-
sely, ‘selection’ with ‘inclusion’. First, since curricula are limited in all sorts of ways – by
time, principally – the idea that ‘selection’ can be simply a ‘broadening of the scope of
material presented to students’ (28) such that ‘inclusion’ does not have to be accom-
panied by an accompanying ‘exclusion’ is a fallacy that speaks to the liberal trope of
inﬁnite and perpetual openness. Second, any removal of a text may not, in fact, be
tantamount to a great act of excision but rather a pragmatic decision based on the
suitability of that particular text to the learning criteria and outcomes of that particular
curriculum. These can intersect with all sorts of other material factors that bear down on
the selection and deselection of learning materials, as anyone with pedagogic
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experience will know. And behind all this, informing and shaping all these factors, are
moral considerations with respect to the instructors’ relation to the material he or she is
teaching. This is clearly part of the textbook adoption scenarios Taylor and others have
examined, but they are equally germane to individual tutors who make morally
informed personal choices as to what to present to their students; to align these
moral choices with ‘censorship’ is to reduce the complexity of syllabus formation into
the ‘ﬂat’ and one-dimensional consideration of liberty that I have discussed earlier: in
some cases it is, indeed, appropriate to talk of the eﬀect of these choices in terms of
‘censorship’ but, conceptually speaking, it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction
between them and these other considerations – ultimately, at a conceptual level, the
question of whether what has not been adopted has therefore been ‘banned’ or
‘prohibited’ is a tricky one that is in fact undecidable in advance. The same is perhaps
less true of texts that have been expurgated, where the term censorship might indeed
be appropriate, but expurgation is also an extreme form of editing, and there is a
continuum in the editing process whereby some forms of editing may be more indistinct
and where the term ‘censorship’ might be too clear-cut a term to be really precise.
There are further considerations that need to be accounted for here, all of which shape
freedom of discourse at a vernacular level, and on an everyday basis, in ways that cannot
be encompassed by the sharp distinction of freedom and censorship. Principal among
these are the commercial and economic factors that are largely invisible but which have a
profoundly important eﬀect on the kinds of discourse that is made available in the
‘marketplace of ideas’, to use a key liberal metaphor. One of the great advantages of
examining textbook adoption processes – and here Taylor’s research is exemplary – is the
way in which it reveals the extent to which commercial considerations decisively shape the
terrain of discourse in free societies. In the United States, the school textbook marketplace
is unlike a ‘normal’market insofar as it is more akin to government procurement conducted
by ‘elected oﬃcials who need to satisfy their constituents in order to retain their positions’ –
hence the politicization of the process (Taylor 2017, 16). In these conditions, ‘publishers
must go to great expense to develop new series of texts without any guarantee that they
will be approved . . . It is therefore in the publishers’ interests to produce material that will
be considered non-controversial by the widest range of readers’ (16–17). The result is that
publishers produce ‘complex lists of content guidelines to assist book editors in their
attempt to toe the narrow line’ between what liberal and conservative protestors deem
acceptable (16). As a result, the ﬂow of discourse is profoundly shaped by rather mechan-
istic accommodations and negotiations that are, ultimately, as much rooted in mundane –
banal, even – considerations of proﬁt and loss as the moral sensitivities of the respective
political antagonists. While these particular circumstances are peculiar to the United States,
the wider point is generalizable to other societies.
Conclusion
What I have tried to do in this article is to outline the ways in which the shaping of
freedom, and of freedom of expression in particular, both constitutes and is con-
stituted by the dynamic of hegemony and counter-hegemony, the shifting of closures
and foreclosures that deﬁne the limits of freedom within and without the bounds of
the law in liberal social orders. The multidimensionality of this complex process
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stands in stark contrast to the ‘planar’ model of liberty that operates within liberal
free speech theory. Shifting the terms of debate on freedom of expression within
liberal social orders is such an urgent and vital task, because the dominant ways in
which it is conceptualized are all rooted in the liberal free speech tradition, which
does not accord with and is inadequate to account for how freedom of expression
actually works as a lived practice as opposed to an abstract theoretical principle.
Moreover, liberal free speech theory is itself not logically consistent even when it tries
to suggest that consistency is precisely what freedom requires. This, in turn, is rooted
in a structure of thinking that conceptualizes freedom in terms of its antithesis and
freedom of expression in terms of the opposition between openness and closure. If,
on the other hand, I have insisted on dismantling these oppositions, it is because
they simply cannot be sustained either theoretically or in relation to social life. We
will never grasp what freedom is if we continue to view it only by the shadow cast by
tyranny, by the other which alone gives freedom its form and substance in many
liberal imaginings. We need instead to see it as a complex and subtle web of
relations, subject to pressures and forces that not only provide the context for liberty
as a lived practice but its content as well. In short, liberty is the sum of a whole series
of calibrations and compromises, such that to speak disparagingly and regretfully of
one’s freedom being ‘compromised’ is to spectacularly misunderstand the very nature
of freedom itself.
Notes
1. Indeed, with respect to free speech, the divergence between Mill and anti-consequentialism
may not, in fact, be as great as it might at ﬁrst appear. It could be argued that anti-
consequentialist liberal arguments take issue not so much with Mill’s theorization of free
speech but his wider arguments for liberty. That is, in pushing his case to the ‘outer limits’
within which free speech should be virtually unlimited, Mill presses his argument for free
speech – but not liberty per se – as far towards an anti-consequentialist position as his wider
consequentialism will allow, such that liberal anti-consequentialism could be read as an
attempt to address (and close) the gap between Mill’s theorization of free speech and his
more avowedly utilitarian arguments for liberty in general.
2. I echo here Zygmunt Bauman’s work on liquid modernity and also work on liquid racism
(Bauman 2013; Weaver 2011; Werbner 2013).
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